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This study examined children’s reactions to violations of their expectancies 
concerning conservation of weight. Three groups were tested: nonconservers 
(mean CA = 8 years, 4 months), young conservers (mean CA = 8 years, 10 
months), and older conservers (mean CA = 11 years). Surprise and cogni- 
tive change were the principal outcomes assessed. Contrary to expectation, 
observable surprise proved infrequent in all groups. In contrast, changes in 
conservation judgment were frequent, although the degree of change was 
reduced somewhat if an appropriate explanation was required. The three 
groups were generally indistinguishable in the extent to which they changed. 
Evidence of active resistance to change (as defined by explanations which 
denied the validity of the outcome) was absent in nonconservers but ap- 
peared in about half the conservers. Older conservers were no more likely 
to resist extinction than were younger conservers. 
The knowledge which children acquire about the world obviously varies 
in its sources and its necessity. At the one extreme are empirically based, 
rote-learned facts; the various state capitals are a common example. At 
the other extreme, at least according to Piaget’s theory, are the numerous 
concepts which have been the focus of Genevan research. In particular, 
Piaget (e.g., 1952) has claimed that concepts of conservation are de- 
pendent less on empirical regularities than on logical implications ; for a 
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child with concrete operational structures, conservation ~must be the case. 
One purpose of the present study was to examine this claim of logical 
necessity. The strategy adopted was to produce an apparent violation of 
conservation. Two classes of reaction were measured. One was expressive 
response, with a particular emphasis on surprise. The expectation was 
that conservers would find nonconservation quite surprising. Tempering 
this expectation somewhat, were the results of previous research: Of the 
four studies which had devised apparent violations of conservation 
(Achenbach, 1969; Charlesworth, 1964; Mermelstein & Meyer, 1969; 
Mermelstein & Shulman, 1967), only Mermelstein and Shulman had re- 
ported surprise in a substantial proportion of subjects. Methodological 
difficulties, however, made the results of these studies uncertain. Two 
problems in particular can be cited: failure to demonstrate that the 
children were conservers by standard measures; and the inevitable diffi- 
culty of inferring affective reaction from facial expression. 
The second kind of outcome examined was cognitive change. Faced 
with apparent nonconservation, a conserver can either maintain his 
logical concept, or revert to his earlier belief in nonconservation. The latter 
outcome has been termed extinction of conservation. As with surprise, a 
clear Piagetian prediction was possible: If concepts of conservation are 
logically necessary, extinction should not occur. Again, previous research 
was not, in line with expectation. Seven studies had examined this predic- 
tion, five wit,h respect to conservation of weight (Hall & Kingsley, 1968; 
Hall & Simpson, 1968; Kingsley & Hall, 1967; Smedslund, 1961b; Smith, 
1968)) two for conservation of liquid quantity (Brison, 1966; Sullivan, 
1967). All had employed essentially the same procedure: Apparent non- 
conservation is produced; the child is asked to explain the outcome; ex- 
tinction or resistance is inferred from the explanation he provides. The 
studies by Hall and Simpson and Smith also elicited judgments on sub- 
sequent conservation trials. The results of these studies can be easily 
summarized: All reported a remarkably high incidence of apparent 
extinction. 
The methodological difficulties of extinction research have been dis- 
cussed at length elsewhere (Miller, 1971). Briefly, the major criticism 
that can he directed against previous studies is that, their criteria for 
assessing extinction have been too limited; the possibility of a socially 
compliant “pseudoextinction” has correspondingly been too great. The 
present study attempted to minimize demand pressures in a situation 
utilizing a number of different measures. 
+k second interest of the st,udy was in how nonconservers react when 
they see conservation. The same quest,ions can be asked as for con- 
servers: Is the child surprised by the violation of his expectancy? And 
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does he change his belief? The first question has received little previous 
attention. Piaget’s book on number (Piaget,, 1952) does report that. non- 
conservers sometimes find a return to the initial state of equality sur- 
prising; his observations of this phenomenon, however, are casual and 
unsystematic. The question is of interest for two reasons. The first is 
diagnostic: As with conservers, the presence or absence of surprise can 
be taken as an indication of the certainty with which the challenged 
belief is held. The second interest stems from the problem of cognitive 
motivation. There are numerous theories which posit that the motivation 
for cognitive change arises from some sort of discord between existing 
structures and new input (e.g., Charlesworth, 1969; Hunt, 1965; Smeds- 
hind, 1961c). Despite the popularity of such approaches, no study has 
demonstrated such reactions in a situation relevant to the development 
of Piagetian concepts. In particular, the various “cognitive conflict” 
training studies (e.g., Gruen, 1965; Smedslund, 1961~) have all inferred 
conflict rather than measured it directly. 
Whereas surprise has not been measured in nonconservers exposed to 
conservation, cognitive change has frequently been examined (e.g., Over- 
beck 8: Schwartz, 1970; Smedslund, 1961a; Smith, 1968). In the present 
study, the interest was less in t,he success of such training per se t.han in 
a number of related questions. Do the nonconservers show surprise? What 
is the relation between surprise and cognitive change? And is it any 
easier to promote training through direct feedback than it is to promote 
extinction, that is, is progressive change more likely than regressive? 
A final focus of the study was on possible developmental changes in 
conservers’ responses to nonconservation. Presumably, t.he strength and 
stability of concepts like conservation increase with the length of time 
that t’hey have been in the cognitive system. If so, then both surprise 
and resistance to extinction should be greater in older than in younger 
conservcrs. 
An overview of the study may help to tie these various threads together. 
The concept examined was conservation of weight. Three groups were 
tested: nonconservers, young conservers, and old conservers. Each group 
received feedback which consistently disconfirmed its expectancy con- 
cerning conservation. Two classes of reaction were measured: expressive 
response, with a particular emphasis on surprise; and cognitive change. 
Surprise was inferred from videotaped facial react.ions, verbalizations, 
and delays in a reaction-time response contingent upon the outcome (the 
latter measure adopted from Charlesworth, 1964; and Charlesworth & 
Zahn, 1966). Cognitive change was inferred from the child’s explanations 
for the outcomes, his judgments and explanations on a series of general- 
ization trials, and his response to posttest questioning. 
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METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects were 130 second-, third-, and fifth-grade children from a 
middle-class suburb of Minneapolis. Of the 130 children, 69 were retained 
for the complete study: 23 second- and third-grade conservers (15 boys 
and eight girls, mean age = 8 years, 10 months), 28 second- and third- 
grade nonconservers (eight boys and 20 girls, mean age = 8 years, 4 
months), and 18 fifth-grade conservers (12 boys and six girls, mean 
age = 11 years). Fifty-five children were rejected because of transitional 
performance on the pretest, and six fifth-graders were rejected because 
they were nonconservers. 
Apparatus 
All testing was conducted in a mobile laboratory trailer. The trailer 
was divided into two rooms separated by a one-way mirror. The subject 
was seated at a table facing the mirror; the experimenter sat to his right. 
The central piece of apparatus was a hanging-pan balance scale. Out- 
comes on the scale could be read in two ways: by the alignment or non- 
alignment of the two pans, or by the movement of a pointer attached to 
the scale arm. The scale was capable of providing accurate feedback as 
to relat’ive weight’; it was also capable of providing systematically dis- 
torted feedback. Embedded in its base were two electromagnets, between 
which hung a soft iron bar attached to the underside of the scale arm. 
Activation of either magnet attracted the bar, causing the arm to swing 
to one or the other side and creating the appearance of unequal weights. 
The magnets were activated by silent foot pedals concealed beneath the 
table. 
The remaining apparatus was designed to assess the subject’s response 
to the feedback. Depression of either foot pedal not only activated the 
magnet but also started a reaction-time clock housed in the second room 
of the trailer. (On trials on which the trick was not desired, setting a 
toggle switch permitted starting the clock wit,hout activating the magnet.) 
The clock could he stopped by pressure on any of three 2-in. diam buttons 
aligned horizontally along an 111/4-in. X 4-in. metal panel placed directly 
in front of the scale. Each of the buttons contained a colored drawing of 
the scale. The left button showed the scale with the left. pan lowered; the 
middle button showed the scale balanced; and the right button showed 
the scale with the right pan lowered. 
The second room also contained a videot,ape unit for recording facial 
expressions. The unit consisted of a videorecorder, monitor, and camera. 
Taping was accomplished through a small hole in the wall located slightly 
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to the subject’s left and at approximately the same height as his head. 
An observer housed in the second room operated the tape unit, registered 
reaction times and reset the clock, set the toggle switch as required, and 
recorded all relevant verbalizations. 
Procedure 
All subjects were tested individually by the same male experimenter. 
Although the procedure was continuous, three phases can be identified: 
pretraining and the conservation pretest; reaction-time and feedback 
trials; postfeedback trials and posttest questioning. 
Pretest phase. The session began with some brief pretraining designed 
to assure that the subject possessed at least some understanding of the 
notion of weight and the operation of the scale. The pretraining com- 
bined verbal explanations of the scale’s workings with demonstrations 
employing everyday objects. The examples included both equalities and 
inequalities. 
The conservation pretest included four trials. The first three were con- 
servation of equality: Two clay balls were weighed and found equal; 
one was then transformed and the conservation question asked. The 
three transformations, balanced for order within age, were into a pancake, 
a sausage, and three small balls. The form of the conservation question 
was as follows: “If we weighed them now, would the green weigh more, 
would they still weigh the same, or would the red weigh more?” followed 
by “Why do you think so?” The final trial was a conservation of in- 
equality: A ball was shown (by means of the foot pedal) to weigh more 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDUW 
Trial Description 
1-4 Conservation pretest: three equality problems, one inequality problem 
Reaction-time practice and baseline: three t,rials of each 
5-7 Conservat,ion feedback: t.wo equality problems, one inequality problem 
8-R Conservation assessment: two equality problems on which S had received 
feedback 
10 Conservation assessment: equality problem on which ‘3 had not received 
feedback 
11 Conservation assessment: equality problem with cardboard squares 
12 Conservation assessment: inequality problem in which S’s task was to make 
the stimuli equal 
13 Conservat,ion assessment: equality problem without use of the scale 
Posttest questioning 
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than a snake; the ball was then rolled into an identical snake and the 
conservation question asked. 
Any subject whose performance did not place him in one of the desired 
groups, i.e., conserver or nonconserver at the younger age, or conserver 
at the older age, was discarded at this point. A child was considered a 
conserver if he answered all four questions correctly, a nonconserver if 
he answered all four incorrectly; any other pattern was regarded as 
transitional. 
Reaction-time and feedback phase. The reaction-time panel was placed 
in front of the scale and introduced as a ‘%vay to tell me what things 
weigh without having to talk.” The resemblance between the pictures on 
the buttons and the various positions of the scale was noted, and the 
subject was instructed to push the button that corresponded to the out- 
come on the scale. A series of practice trials followed, the experimenter 
moving the scale by hand and the subject lift’ing his hand from the start 
position (a square of tape on the table in front, of him) to push the ap- 
propriate button. No subject experienced any appreciable difficulty. 
Six “no-expectancy” reaction-time (RT) trials followed. The stimuli 
on these trials were encased in opaque bags. In all instances the two 
objects weighed the same; apparent differences were produced by means 
of the pedal. The first. three trials served as further practice, the last 
three as baseline. Each of the three possible outcomes appeared once 
within a block of three trials, with their exact, ordering balanced across 
subjects. The RT clock was started by the experimenter’s stepping on 
the foot pedal at the movement of releasing the pans; it was stopped by 
the subject’s button press. 
The succeeding three RT trials consisted of conservation problems 
with feedback. Two of the trials were conservation-of-equality problems 
identical to those of the pretest (each of the three transformations ap- 
pearing equally often across subjects) ; one was the conservation-of- 
inequalit’y problem. The ordering of the particular t’rials was balanced 
within groups. The deviation from the pretest occurred following the 
subject’s judgment and explanation. The subject was informed that the 
objects would be placed back on the scale and instructed to push the 
correct button “as soon as you see what they weigh.” 
The feedback on these trials consistently disconfirmed the subject’s 
original belief about conservation. Thus, nonconservers received three 
trials with conservation outcomes; conservers received three with non- 
conservation outcomes. The latter result was accomplished through ac- 
tivation of the electromagnet. On the equality trials the ball was made 
to appear heavier than the transformed object; in one case the left side 
was heavier and in one case the right. On the inequality trial the magnet 
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was used on the initial weighing to make the ball appear heavier; a sub- 
sequent honest weighing then revealed that the two snakes were equal. 
The subject’s first task on these t,rials was to press the correct button. 
Approximately 3 set after the button push the experimenter asked, “Why 
did that happen?” There followed a period of sympathetic, flexible ques- 
tioning designed to elicit the child’s t’rue feelings about the outcome. Re- 
statements of his prediction and the actual outcome were frequent, as 
were phrases such as “What do you really think?” and “Is there any 
ot.her reason you can think of?” This questioning continued until the 
subject either appeared satisfied with an answer or was clearly unable 
to provide anything further. 
The final measure obtained on these trials was of facial reactions. The 
videorecorder was turned on a few seconds before the stimuli were re- 
turned to the pans, and it continued recording until shortly after the 
experimenter asked “Why did that happen?” 
Postfeedback phase. The postfeedback phase began with the removal 
of the reaction-time panel, coupled with an assurance that the objects 
would no longer be re-weighed. The trials that followed were an attempt 
to depart gradually from the pressures of the feedback situation. The 
first. two were repetitions of the two conservat,ion-of-equality transforma- 
tions on which the subject had received feedback. The third employed 
the conservation-of-equalit’y transformation from the pretest which had 
not been included in the feedback phase. 
The last three trials were a greater departure. The first involved a 
change in both material and deformation: Two cardboard squares were 
weighed and found equal; one was then folded twice and the conserva- 
tion question asked. The next trial returned to the domain of clay but 
changed the form of the question. After an initial weighing had estab- 
lished that a ball was heavier than a cross, the experimenter asked, “What 
could we do to these two things to make them weigh the same?” No 
manipulations were performed, but the subject was encouraged to give 
as many different. answers as he could. 
The final trial began with the removal of the scale. The subject was 
handed two clay balls and asked to judge whether they weighed the 
same; if necessary, they were adjusted until he agreed on the equality. 
One ball was then transformed (in t’he same manner as on the first con- 
servation-of-equality trial) and the conservation question asked. Follow- 
ing his answer, the subject again held the objects and estimated their 
relative weights. 
The session concluded with a period of posttest questioning which 
sought to elicit the child’s t’rue reactions to what had happened. Typ- 
ically, this questioning included verbal formulations of the conservation 
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problem, challenges to the child’s answers (e.g., “But when we started 
you told me . . “), requests to seek for explanations, and questions 
about how sure he was and whether he had changed his mind. 
Children who had experienced apparent nonconservation were not de- 
briefed immediately, since doing so would have increased the probability 
of unwanted communication. At the conclusion of the study itself, how- 
ever, a classroom debriefing was provided for all subjects. 
Scoring 
Trials 12 and 13 were the only ones which departed from standard 
procedure and, thus, required a decision about criteria. A subject was 
credited with conservation on trial 12 if his response avoided a percep- 
tually based solution of the form “Make the ball into a cross too.” He 
was credited with a conservation judgment on trial 13 only if he gave 
an equalit,y response both before and after holding the stimuli. 
TABLE 2 
TYPES OF NONCONSERVATION EXPLANATIONS AND PROPORTION OF SUBJECTS 
GIVING AT LEAST ONF, INSTANCE OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES 
Type of explanation 
Young Old 
conservers conservers 
Addition/subtraction: statement either that addition/sub- 
traction has occurred or t,hat addition/subtraction is the 
only basis for a change in weight 
Trick: statement that a trick has occurred, but with no at- 
tempt t>o specify how it was accomplished 
Scale malfunct,ioning: statement that the scale is either wrong 
or rigged 
Outcome specific to the scale: statement that the outcome re- 
sults from the nature of scales, not from a true change in 
weight 
Pan-placement : statement that the outcome results from the 
way t.he objects were placed on the pans 
More clay to start with: statement that the heavier object 
must have had more clay to start with 
High-level: admission that nonconservation has occurred, but 
wit.h a more sophisticated explanation than that of the 
typical nonconserver (e.g., “Some air escaped when you 
rolled it out.“) 
Unequal weight distribution: statement that t.he total weight 
of an object is a function of how the weight is distributed 
Previorls outcome: reference to a previous occurrence of non- 
c:onservat,ion 
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The explanations which accompanied conservation judgments were 
categorized for both type (e.g., inversion, compensation) and adequacy. 
The percentages of interrater agreement ranged from 94 to 100%. The 
explanations advanced for nonconservation were also categorized into 
types; these types are presented in Table 2. Reliabilities were calculated 
for the responses of the conservers in the feedback and postfeedback 
phases. Interratcr agreement was 94% for the answers of young con- 
servers and 89% for those of old conservers. 
Each child’s videotape was independently rated by two judges. Six 
categories of expressive response were utilized: neutral, serious, thought- 
ful, curious, amused, and surprised. The rating period was divided into 
three phases; only data from the second phase, however, will be reported 
here. This phase began with the onset of feedback and continued until 
the subject made his RT response. 
Interrater agreement proved to be only moderate. The percentage of 
agreement across all three rating periods was 81%. That for the second 
period alone was 76%. 
RESULTS 
Pretest Data 
The pretest yielded a significant sex difference: among the younger 
subjects, boys were more likely to be conservers than were girls [x”(l) = 
5.45, p < .05]. The obvious possibility raised by this finding is t’hat 
comparisons between conservers and nonconservers might be confounded 
by sex differences. It should be noted, therefore, that there is no indica- 
tion that such confounding occurred. 
The difficulty of the pretest is also worth noting. Although unexpected, 
this difficuIty does serve to forestall a possible criticism: With such a 
rigorous test, it seems certain that children identified as conservers really 
were genuine conservers. This conclusion is supported by the fact, that 
93% of the conservation judgments were accompanied by adequate 
explanations. 
The pretest items were not of equal difficulty. The proportion of con- 
servation responses by transitional subjects was 72% on the equality 
trials but only 7% on the inequality (snake) trial. 
Finally, the 6-month difference in average age between nonconservers 
and young conservers should be noted. 
Meas7cre.s of Surprise 
Facial reactions. Table 3 indicates the proportion of subjects emitting 
the various types of expressive response. No distinction is drawn between 
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TABLE 3 
PROPORTION OF SUBJECTS EMITTING THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF EXPRESSIVE 
RESPONSE DURING THE SECOND PHASE OF THE FEEDBACK TRIALS 
Neutral Serious Thoughtful Curious Amused Surprised 
- 
Trial 5 
Nonconservers .36 0 .14 .32 .39 .ll 
Young conservers .30 .04 .13 .26 .52 .09 
Old conservers .25 .06 .ll 39 .50 .06 
Trial 6 
Nonconservers .46 0 .04 .36 .29 .04 
Young conservers .35 .04 .30 .30 .39 .09 
Old conservers .50 .06 0 .ll .39 0 
Trial 7 
Nonconservers .61 .04 .18 .29 .14 0 
Young conservers .39 0 .17 .09 .48 04 
Old conservers .61 .06 .11 .17 .17 .06 
cases in which the response was the only one rated and cases in which 
it was one of several. The only exception is for the neutral category: a 
subject was designated as neutral only if he gave no other response. 
The category of greatest interest is that. of surprise. Table 3 reveals 
that surprise reactions were quite infrequent. With 69 subjects and three 
trials apiece, there were 207 occasions on which surprise might have ap- 
peared. These 207 opportunities yielded 11 instances of observable sur- 
prise. The three groups did not differ in tendency to show surprise; young 
conservers cont,ributed five of the instances, nonconservers four, and older 
conservers two. 
Surprise was the only expressive response for which specific expecta- 
tions were stated. The data in Table 3, however, permit two general con- 
clusions with respect to the other types of expressive reaction. One is 
that the overall level of responding was low. The second is that the pat- 
tern of responding was remarkably similar in the three groups. 
Verbcdizafions. The interest here was in spontaneous verbalizations 
emitted between the stimulus onset. and the experimenter’s question about. 
the outcome. Nineteen subjects produced such verbalizat,ions on at least 
one trial; five verbalized twice. The three groups did not differ in pro- 
portion of subjects verbalizing. If type of verbalization is taken into 
account, however, a significant. difference does emerge. The majority of 
verbalizations were eit.her simpIe statements of the outcome or questions 
about whether to push the button. Six subjects, however, produced utter- 
ances which could be interpreted as indicating surprise, e.g., “That.‘s 
funny,” or “Hey! They’re the same!” Five of these subjects were young 
ronservers; one was an older conserver. The difference between young 
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conservers and nonconservers was significant (p = .014, Fisher’s Exact 
Test). This finding must be qualified, however, by the statement that 
verbalization was rare whatever the subject’s belief. 
Reaction time. Analyses here were based on the difference between the 
subject,‘s reaction time on a feedback trial and his baseline for the out- 
come on that trial. The mean difference scores on the first feedback were 
2.61 set for nonconservers, 2.78 for young conservers, and 2.33 for old 
conservers. The comparable figures for all three trials c,ombined were 
2.46, 2.45, and 1.80. IGone of the differences between groups approached 
significance. 
These difference scores reflect an approximate doubling of the baseline 
values. Thus, the children were slowed down on the feedback trials. 
Clearly, however, an inference that surprise was responsible for the in- 
crease must, remain tentative in the absence of facial indications of 
surprise. 
Measures of Cognitive Change 
There were eight trials following the first occurrence of feedback. The 
percentage of changed predictions on these trials was 49% for noncon- 
servers, 69% for young conservers, and 64% for old conservers. Figure 1 
plots the course of change across trials. 
The first, finding to note is that all three groups showed substantial 
change. They were not equivalent in the extent to which they changed. 
100 _ 
- Nonconservers 
‘- Young conse;vers 
--- Old conservers 
FIG. 1. Change in prediction by the three groups across triais. 
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Young conservers and old conservers did not differ significantly [t(39) = 
.53]. Nonconservers, however, changed significantly less often than young 
conservers [t (49) = 2.65, p < .05]. 
The source of the significant difference can be seen in Fig. 1. Change 
scores increased for both groups through trials 8 and 9 (transformations 
on which the subject had received feedback), then decreased on 10 and 
11 (generalization trials). On trial 12, however, all subjects tended to give 
nonconservation answers. This performance may be another reflection of 
the difficulty of certain forms of the inequality problem (recall the pre- 
test data). In any case, since it was not. included in the pretest,, trial 12 
is questionable as a measure of change. If it is omitted, the proportions 
of change are 68% for young conservers and 55% for nonconservers, a 
nonsignificant difference [t(49) = 1.73, p > ,101. 
The analysis of conservation judgments must be supplemented by a 
consideration of the explanations advanced for the judgments. These 
explanations were dichotomized into adequate vs inadequate for con- 
servation answers and perceptual vs nonperceptual for nonconservation 
answers. A trial was scored as ‘(adequate” if at least one adequate ex- 
planation was present but as “perceptual” only if no other explanation 
appeared. Trial 12 was necessarily omitted, since it did not require an 
explanation. 
Nonconservers who changed to conservation were able to provide a 
logical justification for 89% of their answers. Overall, nonconservers 
gave conservation judgments plus logical explanations on 48% of the 
trials following the first feedback. Young conservers who switched to 
nonconservation offered perceptual explanations for 66% of their an- 
swers; over all trials, their percentage of nonconservation choices ac- 
companied by perceptual explanations was 45%. Thus, again the t.wo 
groups proved equivalent. 
The analyses thus far have focused on appropriate explanations. 
It is also possible to analyze the explanations which were not appro- 
priate for the extent to which they suggest active resistance to change. 
For this analysis, responses to the posttest questioning were grouped 
with those to the feedback and postfeedback trials. 
Ninety-four percent of the inadequate explanations by nonconservers 
consisted either of perceptual answers or of inability to respond. As 
Table 2 indicates, the responses of conservers were considerably more 
varied. The highest level of resistance is defined by the first six cate- 
gories, these being highest because each denies that the unexpected 
outcome has really occurred. Thirteen young conservers produced at 
least one such explanation; one nonconserver did [x*(l) = 15.22, 
p < .OOl]. Perhaps more surprising is the fact that even simpler forms 
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of resistance did not appear in nonconservers. Thus, 11 young con- 
servers offered at least one Previous Outcome response, as compared 
to one nonconserver [x?(l) = 11.39, p < .OOl]. In short’, indications of 
resistance were much more frequent in conservers than in nonconservers. 
The same comparisons can he drawn between young conservers and 
old conservers. .These groups did not differ in number of changed pre- 
dictions, or in number of changed predictions accompanied by a per- 
ceptual explanation, or in the extent to which their explanations sug- 
gested at least some form of resistance. Thus, 83% of the younger and 
89% of the older conservers were able to provide at least one non- 
perceptual explanation. Among these, 57% of the younger and 50% of 
the older subjects offered at least one explanation which denied the 
validity of nonconservation. 
This latter finding is surprising, since it means that the clearest indi- 
cations of resistance were no more frequent in older than in younger 
conservers. The two groups did differ somewhat, however, in type of 
resistance. Eight young conservers suggested that addition or subt.rac- 
tion might account for the inequality; no older subject suggested such 
deception (p = ,005, Fisher’s Exact Test). The older children were more 
likely to attribute nonconservation to some sort of malfunctioning of 
t,he scale. They also were significantly more likely to utilize the cate- 
gories of High Level and Requal Weight Distribution [x2( 1) = 6.65, 
p < .Ol J. These latter types of explanation seem to reflect a “sophisti- 
cated” form of nonconservation: The child admits that nonconserva- 
tion bar occurred, but attempts to encompass the discrepant phenome- 
non within an operational framework. 
Intewelcrtions between Surprise and Cognitive Change 
The infrequency of observable surprise limits what can be said in 
this section. It is possible, nevertheless, to attempt a partial examina- 
tion of the original question. Eight children showed either facial or 
verbal indications of surprise on the first feedback trial. How do these 
children compare with the rest of the sample on measures of cognitive 
change? With such a small N it is impossible to draw any rigorous 
conclusions. Nevertheless, it can be noted that such a comparison yields 
no evidence that surprised subjects were any different from nonsur- 
prised ones in their tendency to change their beliefs. 
DISCUSSION 
Several unexpected findings emerged from this study. One was the 
extremely low level of observable surprise. This result was not entirely 
unexpected in nonconservers; neither previous research nor theoretical 
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analysis provided a clear basis for predicting whether surprise would 
appear in such subjects. The present results suggest that nonconserva- 
tion (at least of weight) is simply not, the sort of concept whose viola- 
tion is surprising. The fact that it L ‘q not raises some doubt, about 
motivational models which place the impetus for cognitive progress in 
feelings of surprise or conflict. While the present manipulation is hardly 
a definitive test of such models, the fact remains that no training study 
has as yet, demonstrated surprise or conflict in preoperational children. 
The absence of surprise in conservers was much more unexpected. 
If valid, this result would appear to contradict Piaget,‘s claim that 
conservation is experienced as logically necessary. Before such a con- 
clusion is accepted, however, several possible objections must be con- 
sidered. The most basic objection is that t,he absence may be only 
apparent and not real-a reflection of the difficulties inherent, in mea- 
suring expressive response. This possibility can certainly not be rlis- 
counted. Nevertheless, the infrequency of observable surprise strongly 
suggests that most conservers did not find the violation of conservation 
surprising. 
The next question is whether the absence of surprise really contradicts 
Piaget,‘s claims concerning logical necessity. A full discussion of this 
issue, however, requires consideration of the extinction data as well. 
This study produced more evidence of resistance to extinction than 
had the majority of previous studies. Thus, in three studies Hall and 
his associates (Hall & Kingsley, 1968; Hall $ Simpson, 1968; Kingsley 
& Hall, 1967) found that only 10 of 92 conservers were able to resist 
extinct.ion by uttering an explanation which denied the validity of the 
nonconservation outcome. In this study 22 of 41 conservers produced 
such explanations. Similarly, both Hall and Simpson (19681 and Smith 
(1968) reported that conservers would readily switch to nonconservation 
predictions following an extinction experience. The present study, how- 
ever, found that only 66% of such changed predictions were accom- 
panied by typical nonconservation explanations. In both cases, appar- 
ent extinction proves at least somewhat deceptive upon closer examination. 
Once this first conclusion is granted, however, a second conclusion 
must. be that, a substantial degree of apparent extinction still emerges. 
The strong indication, from both this and previous studies, is that many 
conservers really do abandon conservation when confronted with coun- 
terinstances. How can such a finding be encompassed within a Piagetian 
framework? Two suggestions will be offered. Both are relevant not, only 
to extinction but also to explaining the low level of surprise. 
The first suggestion is that. the period during which a concept, de- 
velops its full generalit’y and stability may be more extended than has 
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previously been thought. Perhaps children who have mastered conserva- 
tion by the traditional measures still require a “stabilization phase” 
during which the concept acquires the certainty which it carries for 
adults. Certainty would then be an endpoint, perhaps reached more 
quickly by some t,han by ot,hers, but eventually reached by all. Testing 
this notion would obviously require older subjects than the old con- 
servers of this study. 
The second suggestion is that the various Piagetian concepts may 
vary in the extent to which they entail feelings of necessity. Conserva- 
tion of weight, in particular, appears to have more of a “physical fact” 
basis than do many Piagetian concepts; perhaps it never becomes a 
necessity for some people. Such a finding need not imply that ot,her 
Piagetian concepts are equally extinguishable. 
The one subset of the data which remains to be discussed concerns 
cognit’ive change by nonconservers. The degree of apparent training was 
substantial. While some change appeared to reflect a rote-learned pseudo- 
conservation, some appeared genuine: Correct judgments and appropriate 
explanations appeared throughout t,he posttest trials. How can the suc- 
cess of such empirically oriented training be explained? Three answers 
can be briefly suggested. They are that feedback training might pro- 
duce genuine progress if: there are developmentally earlier conserva- 
tions on which the trained conservation can build; the child is already 
fairly close to developing the concept. naturally; and the trained con- 
cept has a basis in physical knowledge. All of these conditions were 
present, here. 
Several directions can be suggested for future study. Methodologically, 
the major task is to obtain better measures of the outcomes under 
investigation here. Perhaps the most promising new measures would be 
physiological reactions in the case of affective response and a delayed 
posttest, in the case of cognitive change. Substantively, the most inter- 
esting question concerns the problem of logical necessity. The sugges- 
tions for further research have already been implied: Devise violat’ions 
for a variety of Piagetian concepts, and measure the effects at a num- 
ber of different points in development’. Such research should provide a 
firmer basis for evaluating this central Piagetian claim. 
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